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Protective Capital and Poverty Traps
Dr. Ali Saedvandi1
Abstract
We investigate a protective role for capital and the implications on
poverty reduction policies. Within the framework of an overlapping
generations model, the accumulation of tax-funded ‘protective
capital’ increases the survival probability of productive capital from
disastrous events. Key findings highlight how a low survival
probability of capital can stimulate a shift to higher or lower early
consumption, which might result in escapable or inescapable traps.
The model explains that injection of capital can be ineffective if the
required level of protection has not been attained. We show how
higher TFP assists wage tax system to escape from traps.

JEL: I32, O19, O41
Keywords: Growth, Poverty Trap, Overlapping Generations Model, Depreciation

1. INTRODUCTION
Disasters, natural or human-made, can take place anywhere in the world regardless
of the income level of the people affected. Developed nations can incur large
amounts of damages from catastrophic events in absolute terms; however, less
developed countries witness more destructive impacts from disasters on the lives of
inhabitants, particularly when losses are compared with their income level.
The fact is that people of the less developed countries (LDCs)—which are very
likely also highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America, and Asia—are more vulnerable to natural disasters. According to a United
Nations’ report (2008), the frequency of disasters per year increased from 78 to 351
during 1970-2006. As a matter of fact, the average number of casualties for each
disaster has been on a declining trend. In contrast, the total number of people
affected by natural hazards and the estimated costs of damages has sharply
increased. The UN report concludes, ‘As disasters have become less lifethreatening, they have become more threatening to the well-being of the
communities that are hit’ (Page 81).
The current work attempts to elucidate a relationship between disastrous events
and the possibility of the occurrence of poverty traps. The paper suggests that
calamities can produce rather short-term damages in developed nations, contrasting
with the long-term catastrophic consequences in LDCs and HIPCs, because of the
magnitude of losses relative to the GDP in poorer nations. This notion can be
supported by the data on the estimated cost of the worst damages relative to income
in the past 30 years. According to United Nations (2008), while the 1980 earthquake
in Italy, among OECD countries, is recorded as the costliest natural event (4.3
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percent of the GDP) in the last 50 years, damages in less developed nations can
amount to multiple times of their income; for instance, a loss of 309 percent of the
GDP in North Korea in 2005.
Our model shows that poor societies are unable to fend off the catastrophic
impacts of disastrous events on their productive capital unless some particular level
of protective capital has already been accumulated. One negative consequence of
this issue is that LDCs that obtain lesser amounts of protective capital than the
required threshold level are susceptible to being entrapped in poverty in an
inescapable steady-state, which might render traditional poverty reduction policies
ineffectual.
An extensive body of literature exists on the causes of the poverty trap. Azariadis
(2006) categorizes theories in this field into three groups: threshold effects,
institutions, and neighbourhood effects. This paper develops a ‘threshold effect
model’ based on the endogenous lifetime model Chakraborty (2004) and its revised
version published in Poverty Trap (2006). Chakraborty endogenizes longevity
through the probability of the survival of individuals from the first period to the next in
an overlapping generations model. The probability of survival varies with the level of
tax-funded health capital. Chakraborty finds supportive evidence for his hypothesis
from an empirical analysis of the relationship between life expectancy and long-term
economic growth.
The present paper attempts to endogenize depreciation of physical capital through
an overlapping generations model which includes a probability function for the
survival of productive capital. The probability that capital will remain unscathed from
the first period of an individual’s life to the next depends upon the accumulated level
of tax-funded protective capital. By modelling the probability of survival, this paper
aims to account for different reactions to the possibility of catastrophic events from
economies which are at different stages of development. The model predicts a low
level of either productive or protective capital would result in stagnation.
In contrast to Chakraborty (2004), we suppose constant longevity that eliminates
an impact on the propensity to save, but introduces a new element because the
propensity to save depends on the remuneration of saving. It might be interpreted
that one foundation of endogeneity of the saving rate is replaced by another one;
however, this fact did not result in poverty trap when the Chakraborty’s logarithmic
utility function is investigated. The main contribution of our work is the unique
methodology to analyze the implication of CRRA utility into the theory of poverty trap
and the role of ‘intertemporal elasticity of substitution’ in emergence of an escapable
or an inescapable trap.
Although disasters are rarely associated with poverty traps in the theory of growth,
the concept of rare disasters has been used by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) to
explain the equity premium puzzle. Barro (2006) employs a stochastic model to
calibrate the equity premium. Our deterministic model can be viewed as the first step
into a more general stochastic model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II further distinguishes between protective
capital and production capital and explains its importance in the set up of the model.
In section III, different types of poverty traps are defined. The model is defined in
section IV, which examines the effects of protective capital on capital accumulation
in an OLG model. The role of two different shapes of productive capital survival
probability functions, pulse and general form, on the behaviour of the model are also
discussed in this section. Next, some policies on poverty reduction, such as external

capital injection and wage taxation system, are discussed in section V. The paper
concludes in section VI.

2. PROTECTIVE VERSUS PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
In the last half of the previous century, the theory of growth has persuasively
emphasized the role of the accumulation of productive capital as the explanatory
cause of development. One strand of models identifies different types of capital such
as physical, human, and social capital as stimulants of growth. The common premise
of these models is that the role of capital in an economy is solely to be productive.
The second branch focuses on productivity itself. These models associate the
observed ongoing, widespread, and growing inequality in standards of living within
and among nations with the variety of productivity levels observed around the globe.
It is conventionally believed that in addition to the levels of different types of
capital and the observed varieties of productivities, some other still unknown factors
are involved in accounting for the magnitude of per capita income gap around the
world. The proposed model introduces a new function for capital which is called
protective capital. Protective capital preserves productive capital against hazards.
Natural calamities such as droughts, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, landslides,
hurricanes, epidemics, and volcanoes as well as man-made disasters such as
depressions, credit crunches, industrial events, transportation accidents, wars, ethnic
tensions, social or political unrests, pollution, and climate change all endanger the
quality of human life. The question is how the impacts of some catastrophic events
with the same magnitude drastically vary across nations. Why does an earthquake
claim more than 100,000 lives in Haiti and still remarkable stronger one in Chile
leaves less than 500 victims? (Wikipedia)
This paper argues that a high level of protective capital is the main contributor to
the relatively restricted damage of an earthquake in one of the two countries. Thus, a
direct upshot of the recognition of the role of protective capital is to increase its
investment level.
When it comes to funding protective capital, its stark distinction from productive
capital appears. Private investors look at the expected rate of return for any
investment to decide whether to invest in productive capital. Therefore, investors
continue funding productive capital as long as the expected return meets the
investors’ required return. However, for protective capital, the concept of rate of
return is less clear and depends upon the expected loss of each catastrophic event
as well as the expected return of productive capital. In addition, protection usually
requires collective actions and market failure can be a consequence of investing in
protective capital only through free markets. Therefore, in the present model
productive capital is funded through free market in contrast with protective capital
that is funded by levying wage tax.
This setting resembles Chakrobarty’s model with health capital; however, here we
consider a minimal role for protective capital. Protective capital only boosts the
expected return of capital and does not change the longevity of individuals. Our
objective is to present that the impact of protective capital accumulation on the
individuals’ expectation can be a sufficient condition for escapable or inescapable
poverty traps, depending on individuals’ preferences.

3. TYPES OF POVERTY TRAP
The classical definition of poverty trap is ‘any self-reinforcing mechanism which
causes poverty to persist’ Azariadis & Stachurski (2005). A more technical
description is that a poverty trap occurs when, in a multi-equilibria growth model, the
mechanisms of free markets would be unable to move the economy from a lowincome steady-state to any of high-income steady-states without an intervention from
external sources or from government. In this line, we define three types of poverty
trap: (1) inescapable poverty trap, (2) alternating poverty trap, and (3) semi-trap.
Inescapable poverty trap: in the framework of the proposed model, this is a type
of poverty trap that external capital injection would be ineffective for escaping from
the trap. In other words, this is a case where no amount of foreign financial aid would
be able to lead the economy towards the other high-income steady-state level(s). In
turn, if capital injection would possibly be effective in poverty reduction in a poverty
trap, this is called an ‘escapable trap’.
Alternating poverty trap: An alternating trap occurs when an economy alternates
between two inferior and superior income levels. Neither of the two levels are
steady-sates, though the combination of the two can be observed as a mixed
equilibrium.
Semi-trap: it is a steady-state in a multi-equilibria free-market economy, which the
economy is able to surpass the low-income but never reaches the potentially highincome steady-state and will be entrapped in an equilibrium between the two
extreme levels.

4. PROTECTIVE CAPITAL AND OLG MODELS
We assume a standard Diamond-type two-period overlapping generations model
(Diamond, 1965). Individuals save a portion of their wage during the first period in
hopes of consuming the entirety of the invested funds plus the returns from capital
market in the second stage of their life. Yet, there is a possibility that at the end of
the first period investors could lose their entire investment due to a disastrous event.
The probability of the loss depends upon the stock of tax-funded protective capital.

A. The Environment
A constant number of individuals cohorts, v = 0, 1, 2… are born during each period
and inelastically supply their labour force for only one period in exchange for a
wage, . Individuals of each cohort live for two periods and during the second
period of their life supply no labour force, but consume their savings plus returns
from capital market.
In addition to productive capital, the economy accumulates protective capital,
which increases the probability of the survival of productive capital. We assume that
at the end of the first period of the cohort’s life a major disastrous event takes place.
In the absence of protective capital, a low portion of productive capital would remain
for the second period of individuals’ lives. Therefore, in addition to the traditional
depreciation rate of productive capital, it is also important to define
] such that
→[
, as a probability function of productive
capital survival when the protective capital level is qt ≥ 0. With no investment in
protective capital, there is only a small chance of productive capital survival. This low
probability of survival is denoted by
. In turn, as protective capital is accumulated
over time, the probability of productive capital survival converges towards an upper

limit
. Accordingly, disastrous events are expected to destroy
of the
entire stock of productive capital.
The probability function,
, is increasing in the stock of protective capital, q,
and satisfies
,
Assumption (2)
→
,
Assumption (3)
→
2
Assumption (4)
Individuals maximize their expected CRRA utility function over the two periods:
⁄

⁄

,

(1)

subject to two budget constraints:
,
̃
,
where
Moreover, is the amount of savings at time t and ̃
is the expected
total return from the capital market on saving
The production function
is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns
to scale, capital shares of
and A > 0. Therefore, in per worker terms
,
(2)
where stands for per worker productive capital. We also assume:
Assumption (1)
In a competitive free market, wage and capital rent rates are determined as
follows:
,
(3)
,
(4)
[ ] is the depreciation rate of productive capital. Also, since each
where
period lasts for half of a cohort’s life, it can be assumed that
Therefore, the expected return from the capital market, ̃ , is the gross return from
the capital market, , multiplied by the chance of survival,
.
̃
.
Despite the fact that disastrous events are systematic, undiversified risks in the
economy, we assume that each country takes actuarially fair insurance from
international institutions and the size of the economy and the damages from
disasters are such small and uncorrelated with the rest of the world that the
international institutions do not require risk premium. This assumption makes
deterministic. Also, Blanchard (1985) and Yari (1956) are followed to abstract from
the risk associated with the expected return,
. In fact, we assume perfect
annuities system with intermediation of mutual funds. These international insurance
setup and annuities system guarantee the deterministic ̃ , which differs among
countries depending upon the values of
.
Protective capital is accumulated by the public sector through a flat wage tax rate
[ ] and depreciates at a constant rate
[ ].
The law of motion for protective capital is
.
for all cohorts
with q0 > 0 as given.
Similar to , we assume
2

Two functional forms that satisfy the properties of the probability function are
where
[ ] and
where
.

.
Notably, the probability of disasters is unaffected by the value of
impacts on the size of losses from a disaster.

(5)
and

only

B. General Equilibrium
Given the wage and capital rent rates and the deterministic structure of rate of
return, individuals’ maximization process of their CRRA utility function subject to the
budget constraints yields Euler’s equation:
(

̃

)

.

(6)

The above equation shows how economies with different ‘intertemporal elasticity of
substitution’, (θ ) respond to a change in expected return of capital, ̃
.
Then equations (3), (4), and (6) yield the saving function:
( ⁄(
̃
))
{ ⁄
}
(7)
The capital stock in period t + 1 would be equal to the level of savings in period t:
{ ⁄(
)}
(8)
Then we have:
(
)
(9)
One obvious steady state solution for equation (8) is
; however, there is no
closed form solution for the other possible steady states. As follows we introduce a
dynamic analysis for the other unique stable steady state, based on the method of
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Thus we define average productivity of capital
̅
and rewrite equation (9) at the steady-state level:
̅
[ ̅]
(10)
The above transformation towards average productivity of capital facilitates the
analysis of steady state solutions. Also, it is customary to analyze the dynamics of
Diamond-type models by describing the properties of the law of motion of the capital
k. Since it is impossible to rearrange equation (9) in the form of
, there is
no exact analysis for CRRA models. In the following we attempt to offer a reasonable
approximation which enables us to analyse the dynamics of CRRA models.
Although the LHS of equation (10) does hold for all the values of capital, the RHS is
only valid for the steady state levels. The general form of RHS for all levels of capital
⁄
is
. Nevertheless, the following equation
suffices for dynamic analysis by adopting the linear approximation:
[
]
(11)
In order to investigate the role of protective capital on the possibility of the poverty
trap, we assume a pulse function for the probability of productive capital survival.

C. Pulse Probability Function
Initially, it may be supposed that the survival probability of productive capital is a
pulse function. In other words, there is a threshold, Q, for protective capital to be
effective:
{
In the case of
the probability of the survival of productive capital from
disastrous events is low
. In this circumstance, depending upon the
economy’s utility function, young individuals prefer to consume more or less of their

wages immediately. As
, the model converges to a standard CRRACobb Douglas OLG model with a unique stable steady-state level.
Accordingly, it may be further supposed that ̅
represents the steady-state
̅ . The average productivity of capital at steady-state
level of
i.e.
̅
level, ̅ , may be defined as
and equation (8) at the steady-state
level can be rewritten:
[
]
.
The same analogy can be employed in the case of

(9)
:

[

]
.
(10)
The left hand side of equations (9) and (10) are defined as
[
] and the right-hand side as
; both can take indices of
max or min. FIGUREs 1, 2, and 3 illustrate equations (9) and (10) when is less
than, greater than, or equal to 1, respectively. The RHS’s of equations (9) and (10)
are the same line (
which is a straight line with the slope of
and goes through the origin. A social planner might reach the required
outcome by changing the slope of L through fine tuning of tax rate τ.
̅ , then
If the stock of capital in an economy is below the steady-state level,
with the accumulation of capital the value of
approaches to ̅ ; and equivalently the
value of average productivity of capital, , decreases from infinity towards . This is
presented in FIGUREs 1, 2, and 3, where due to a decrease in , the values of L
decreases and the values of
may increase, decrease, or remain constant
depending upon θ. No matter what the value of θ is, the gap between L and
decreases as more capital accumulates. Similar logic is valid when the initial capital
̅.
stock is above the steady-state level,
In the discussion that follows, the possibility of poverty traps are investigated and
an attempt is made to analyze policies to avoid or escape the trap. It is noteworthy
that all of the analyses are based on the values of instead of . Care must be
taken regarding the inverse relation between the two values: as capital stock, ,
goes to infinity, the average productivity of capital, , goes to zero. Furthermore,
whenever the two values of are compared, the higher (lower) is associated with
the lower (higher) .
Two parameters have more significant impacts on the behaviour of the model: (1)
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/θ; and (2) the protective capital threshold
level, Q.
As mentioned, the shapes of
and
depend upon the value of As is
equal to, less than, or greater than 1, the shape of would be a straight line, or a
decreasing convex, or an increasing concave curve. In any event, the equations (9)
and (10) have unique stable steady-state solutions which result from the intersection
of functions L and . Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004).
The inverse value of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ, determines which
steady-state level,
or
, would be higher. In the case of
, the curve of
is below the curve of
and both are decreasing convex curves (FIGURE 1).
Therefore,
intersects L first at a higher
Thus,
which is
̅
̅
equivalent to
In such an economy, as the capital survival probability
increases, young individuals favour higher savings over early consumption, which
results in lower consumption in the first period of their lives and higher consumption
in the second period
.

<FIGURE 1>
On the contrary, if
, the curve of
is above
and both are increasing
concave curves (FIGURE 2). Therefore,
intersects L first at a higher
Thus
̅
̅
, which is equivalent to
In such a situation, the elasticity of
the saving function with respect to the probability of capital survival becomes
negative
, and income effects dominate substitution effects. Therefore,
individuals are less willing to postpone early consumption to the next period.
<FIGURE 2>
Another case occurs when the utility function is logarithmic
. Individuals
with logarithmic utility functions do not vary their investment decisions with the
changes in the expected rate of return or the probability of capital survival. As
FIGURE 3 illustrates in such cases, both curves of
and
collapse into one
⁄
single straight line
.
<FIGURE 3>
A poverty trap might occur depending upon the value of the threshold level of
protective capital Q relative to the steady-state levels ̅
and ̅
. In order to
facilitate the current analysis of poverty trap based on the values of , an equivalent
value for Q is defined. From equation 5, protective capital in the second period is
fully funded through a given wage tax rate:
.
(11)
Then, the minimum productive capital that is required to raise the level of protective
capital to above the threshold level Q is
⁄
(12)
Similar
to
and
equations
(9)
and
(10),
⁄
. This is the equivalent value of
that is
associated with the threshold level Q.
Depending upon the relative value of
to
and
and for the cases
wherein is less than, greater than, or equal to 1, an economy can be in no trap, in
an escapable, or an inescapable trap, or even in alternating traps. Propositions 1 to
5 further distinguish these different possibilities.
Proposition 1. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability
function of productive capital survival, a poverty trap does not exist if
Proof: If
, then
(FIGURE 1, Panel (a)). The first situation is that the
economy starts from a stock of productive capital level, , for which
̅
̅
(equivalently
). Since
, protection is not
effective yet and the capital stock grows on a path towards ̅ , or equivalently
average productivity of capital decreases towards
. However, the value of will
reach
before ̅
, and at this level of capital, protection is activated, which jumps
to the maximum probability of capital survival. In short, the path towards steady-state
shifts from
to
. Higher capital survival probability implies a higher expected
rate of return for capital, and, since
, substitution effects dominates income

effects and the economy tend more towards saving. Capital is accumulated on a new
path towards a new steady states level of ̅
) and surpasses ̅
)
without being entrapped.
If
, then
(FIGURE 2, Panel (a)). It can be supposed that the
economy starts from a stock of productive capital level , in which
̅
̅
(equivalently
). Again, since
, protection
̅
is not effective yet and the capital stock grows on the path towards
, but reaches
earlier and jumps to the new path towards ̅
. The difference between this
case and the case when
is that now income effects dominate substitution
effects. In such an economy, as higher protection of capital is activated (
reaches ), individuals increase their early consumption. Notably, the steady-state
capital stock at the maximum probability of capital survival is lower than the steady
̅ ) because of
state at the minimum probability of capital survival ( ̅
individuals preferences for early consumption.
In both cases of if
, then the economy is on the path of
and will
̅
move towards
with no trap.
Proposition 2. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability
function of productive capital survival, an inescapable poverty trap exists if
Proof: If the initial level of capital stock is below ̅
, then the capital stock
converges towards ̅
without hitting
. We suppose that a remarkable measure
of foreign aid is injected into the economy increasing the level of capital stock above
the threshold level;
The proposed model will show that capital stock again
converges to the trap level of ̅ .
If
, then
(FIGURE 1, Panel (c)). In that case, the economy starts
̅
̅
from
, wherein
(equivalently
).
Since
, protection is already effective and the capital stock decreases on the
path towards ̅
; or equivalently, average productivity of capital decreases towards
̅
the level of
. However, since
, the value of drops below
before
reaching ̅
and at this level of capital, protection becomes deactivated and leads
to the minimum probability of capital survival which then triggers a shift from
to
. The economy will be entrapped in the new steady states level of ̅
)
and foreign aid fails to achieve ̅
).
If
, then
(FIGURE 2, Panel (c)). We suppose that the economy
̅
̅
starts from a stock of productive capital level in which
(equivalently
). Again, since
, protection has already
been effective and the capital stock decreases on a path towards ̅
, however it
̅
drops below
before reaching
, which then triggers a shift from
to
.
̅
The economy will be entrapped in the steady-states level of
) and never
̅
achieve
).
A widely-recognized method of escaping any form of poverty trap is to inject
productive capital from the outside. However, as long as the level of capital injection
̅
is below the gap,
, the economy is unable to maintain the level of
protective capital above the threshold level and remains in the trap. When the
injected capital exceeds through a big push, the economy might be able to obtain
enough production in order to invest in protective capital and maintain its level above

Q. In this case, individuals preferences play a significant role. Proposition 3 and 4
demonstrates this situation.
Proposition 3. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability
function of productive capital survival, if
and
then an
escapable poverty trap exists.
Proof: It is supposed that the initial capital stock is below ̅
or equivalently
̅
(FIGURE 1, Panel (b)). Capital stock converges towards
on the path
of
. At this inferior steady-state level, any external capital injection below the gap
̅
of
is futile as the economy converges back to the steady-state level of
̅
However, an external capital injection above the gap level of activates the
higher protection for productive capital and shifts the economy to a new path of
towards the superior steady-state level of ̅
An important point here is the role of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/ ).
Since
, substitution effects dominate income effects; thus, when the economy
shifts to the new path of
, individuals tend to save more and this helps further
the accumulation of productive capital towards a superior steady-state of ̅
In
contrast, Proposition 4 demonstrates a situation in which income effects dominate
substitution effects. As a result, when the economy shifts to the new path, individuals
increase their early consumption such that the superior path cannot be sustained
and the economy arrives at an ongoing alternation between the two paths.
Proposition 4. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability
function of productive capital survival, if
and
, then an
alternating poverty trap exists.
Proof: It is supposed that the initial capital stock is below ̅
or
(FIGURE
2, Panel (b)). Capital stock converges towards ̅
on the lower path of
.
̅
However, before reaching
it strikes the threshold level of
or equivalently
which activates capital protection and the economy shifts to the upper path of
.
On the new path, the current capital stock is above the new steady-state level of
̅
or equivalently
. Therefore, the economy starts to consume more and
save less towards a new steady-state level which is lower than the current amount.
Consequently, the capital stock level drops below the threshold level of ̅ and again
the economy shifts back to
. In this situation, the economy will not reach either
of the two steady-state levels, but alternate about ̅
The alternating poverty traps might appear unrealistic as the economy alternates
between maximum and minimum probability of capital survival. This situation stems
from the strong assumption of the pulse probability function. In actuality, the
probability of capital survival rises gradually as protective capital accumulates. In
section D, a general probability function is employed that substitutes the alternating
poverty trap with a steady-state between the two extreme levels of ̅
and ̅
Using CRRA utility, this study emphasizes on individuals’ preferences and thereby
reaches unique results. It is noteworthy that in such situations the literature of growth
economics usually considers a logarithmic utility function which is the case of
;
however, as FIGURE 3 illustrates such an assumption will result in disappearance of
traps and a zero investment level in protective capital as the optimal policy.

D. General Form Probability Function
In this section, the conclusions in C are extended by employing a general probability
function that satisfies assumptions 2, 3, and 4. For the new probability function, two

thresholds,
and
, are assumed as the lower and upper limits for protective
capital to be effective in incremental enhancement of probability capital survival. The
probability of productive capital survival is defined as
{
where

is continuous and increasing in q; that is

,

and

Similar to the case of pulse probability function, the minimum levels of productive
capital that are required to raise the level of protective capital to the threshold levels
of
and
are defined as
⁄
⁄
,
and
Again, similar to

:
⁄

and

⁄
.
This is the equivalent value of
that is associated with the threshold levels
and .
Depending upon the values of
and
, relative to
and
and for the
cases of being less than, or greater than one, an economy can be in no trap, in an
escapable, or in an inescapable traps or in a semi-trap.
<FIGURE 4>
The introduction of a general probability function reaffirms most of the results of
the less-complicated pulse probability. Therefore, the results of Proposition 1 of notrap conditions can simply be extended to the conditions of
in the case of
(FIGURE 4, Panel (a)) and
in the case of
(FIGURE 5, Panel (a)), respectively. Additionally, the results of Proposition 2
regarding an inescapable trap is extendable to the conditions of
in the case of
(FIGURE 4, Panel (c)) and
in the case of
(FIGURE 5, Panel (c)).
<FIGURE 5>
In a more subtle way, the escapable trap of Proposition 3 can be extended to a
general probability model when
in the case of
(FIGURE 4, Panel (b)). An economy with a low stock of capital accumulates the two
types of capital and thereby average capital productivity declines on the curve
of
. However, a minimum threshold level triggers higher protection at before
reaching
. As a result, the economy shifts to a path below
and above
.
This new path has a lower steady-state level of
that is lower than the current level
of The economy continues accumulating capital and the path of incrementally
shifts downward until it reaches a steady-state level of
on a path which is
called
. In case of a minor capital injection into the economy, the value of
drops below
on a new path which is below
. The new steady-state level
of this path is greater than This new economy with incrementally higher capital

stock relative to the trap and lower average capital productivity relative to
would increases early consumption and eventually move back to
While an incremental capital injection would be futile in this economy, a big push
could change the situation. In the case of a capital injection large enough to raise the
value of above
, which would force the level of below , the level of capital
protection would attain the maximum possible level and the path of the economy
would shift to
However, in this situation,
. Thus, the economy
would consume more and invest less towards
. However, before reaching
,
the value would drop below and the economy would shift incrementally upward
to a new path of . Finally, it would reach a superior steady-state,
, which is
located on
. This is a new steady-state level and if the value of marginally
exceeds
, will return to this equilibrium. The fact that a minimal capital
injection is unable to release the economy from the inferior equilibrium indicates that
this is a trap; meanwhile, the reality that a big push would lead the economy to a
superior steady-state level justifies the oxymoron of ‘escapable trap’.
As mentioned above, if the value of
goes incrementally beyond
or
drops incrementally below
, then the value of would return to the relevant
stable equilibrium, and such a movement indicates that there is another
equilibrium,
, above which the value of increases and
below which the value of decreases. This new equilibrium is unstable and is a
result of the intersection of line L with the path of
.
The conditions of
are sufficient conditions for having an
escapable trap. In fact, the necessary conditions are less restrictive and if
then the economy has an escapable trap with two equilibria.
Notably, if
, then
. In turn, if
,
then
. If both conditions simultaneously hold, then
would be the
third stable equilibrium.
The counterparty of an escapable trap when
is an economy with a single
equilibrium between the two extreme equilibria which is called a ‘semi-trap’. Although
a semi-trap has an edge over the inferior steady-state,
, with higher consumption
and capital levels, it is still dominated by the superior steady-state ,
. Therefore,
the semi-trap in the case of general probability function is more intuitive than the
alternating trap in the case of pulse probability function.
Proposition 5. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a general probability
function of productive capital survival, if
and
then there exists
a unique steady-state (semi-trap), , where
.
Proof: As
, the economy keeps capital accumulation towards
on
and higher protection is activated as the average capital productivity falls
bellow . Therefore, the curve of φ shifts incrementally upward and since line L is
increasing, the new steady-state (intersection of φ and L) is larger than the previous
one,
. In turn, the capital accumulation process ensures that the new
value of
is smaller than the previous one. Thus, the gap between
and the
steady-state level decreases. As this process repeats, the gap approaches to zero
and reaches its steady-state level, .
If the value of
drops below
, the new path φ would be lower than
.
Then either the new is located on the line L, which means the economy obtains
multiple equilibria on the line L, or its value is lower than the steady state level and
will return to the value of .

On the other hand, if the economy starts with a large capital stock and the value of
is less than
, then, accordingly, same arguments is valid for a decreasing gap
process that guarantees extending to its steady-state, .
Again, if goes beyond
, the new path φ would be higher than
. Then,
either the new is located on the line L which means the economy obtains multiple
equilibria on the line L or its value is above the steady-state level and will revert to
the value of .
In this economy either there is a unique equilibrium,
or infinite equilibria
on the line L between
and .

5. POLICY DISCUSSION
One of the conclusions of the present paper is that lack of protective capital can be
an explanatory factor for the fact that a large amount of the foreign aid awards to
LDCs or sovereign loans to HIPCs fails to bring about the expected economic
development. In fact, the injection of productive capital into these nations can be
ineffective because the productive capital will be wasted if the required level of
protective capital has not yet been attained. Therefore, focusing on ‘Productive
Capital Waste Management’ (PCWM) is the direction recommended here.
Two types of policies regarding PCWM are ‘injecting protective capital’ and/or
‘funding protective capital through higher wage tax rates’. A protective capital
injection is an external policy that can be adopted by international institutions such
as the World Bank and the IMF. Relative to the current policy of a productive capital
injection, the protective capital injection is a more direct treatment, focusing on the
source of the problem, which is capital waste. In contrast, raising wage tax rates is
an internal policy which can be implemented by governments.
Protective Capital Injection: In a country with a developed fiscal system, a
portion of the wage of young individuals is taken by the government and is invested
as protective capital. However, any obstacle that interrupts this process, such as lack
of an effective taxation system, misallocation of resources due to corruption, or
investment in productive rather than protective capital, can entrap the economy in
poverty. These obstacles make any productive capital injection ineffective due to a
high possibility of capital waste. Therefore, based on the proposed model, an
external injection of protective capital is preferred over productive capital.
Nevertheless, an external aid system that aims at raising the stock of protective
capital to a level above the threshold can bypass the obstacles and draw the
economy into a new world of high probability of capital survival. Nonetheless, the
unfortunate result of the proposed model is that the injection of protective or
productive capital would be effective only in a very specific situation: when
and
. It is worth to notice that literature of economics often consider
a value of
. As previously mentioned, in the case of inescapable traps, capital
injection is ineffective as higher capital would be consumed and have no impact on
the steady-state level.
Easterly (2009) conducts a comprehensive literature review on the effectiveness
of Western aid effort towards Africa. His survey contrasts ‘transformational’ approach
to ‘marginal’ approach. In order to distinguish the two approaches, he considers the
ambition or goal of each approach. The goal of transformational approach is a large
permanent gain in an economic indicator or a number of social indicators, at the
aggregate level. In a marginal approach, the ambition of the aid program is to solve a
very specific problem of a target population.

The literature reports disappointing results from transformational approach,
however, evidences some successes for marginal approach. It seems that there is a
link between the transformational / marginal approaches and the two concepts of
protective and productive capital. In fact, most of the transformational aids are
focused on injecting productive capital into a poor society opposite to many of
marginal projects such as health-related campaigns which are in nature protective.
As a result, the ineffectiveness of transformation approach can be interpreted as the
failure of productive capital injection policy, and the limited success of marginal
approach can be seen as empirical potential for research on protective capital.

Increase in Wage Tax Rates: A social planner can make two impacts on an
economy through higher wage tax rates. First, irrespective of the value of θ, a higher
tax rate indicates a steeper L, which in turn increases the steady-state levels,
and
, while
and
remain the same. Second, a higher tax rate
increases the threshold levels or the pair of and .
As FIGURE 1 illustrates, when
, the necessary and sufficient condition for a
no-trap situation is that
or equivalently ̅
. Here, a sufficient
condition,
, is considered. From equation 9, it can be concluded that in the
case of pulse probability function and
, a wage tax rate,
, exists if
and only if
. Replacing the equivalent amount for
and further
simplification yields
⁄
.
(13)
Condition 13 sets a limit for the maximum value of Q that can be supported by a
wage taxation system in order to avoid a poverty trap. As a result, if the required
threshold of protective capital for a shift from low to high capital survival probability is
very high relative to the value of Total Factor Productivity, A, then no wage tax rate
in the range between zero and one exists to release the economy from the trap.
<FIGURE 6>
FIGURE 6 depicts the values of the right-hand side of condition 13 for the ranges
of
and
. Based on this FIGURE, the right-hand side varies in a
range between 0 and 0.3. For example when
, a wage tax rate of
approximately 0.75 would yield the highest value for

, which is 0.3. Therefore, if

⁄
Q is located in the range of
, there will be a tax rate which
allows the economy escape from a vicious cycle of poverty. This potential reflects
the importance of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) improvement in poverty reduction.
In fact, as A increases one percent, the taxation system can support a 1.43 percent
higher value for Q.
One of the results of the argument above is that the wage tax system cannot
support relatively high values of Q in nations with low TFP levels. Therefore,
enhancement of productivity would assist poverty reduction programs from two
directions: first, higher productivity implies higher income and therefore, more
investment in protective capital level; and, second, higher productivity enables the
economy to support higher threshold level of Q through wage tax. Therefore, any
policy that would raise productivity is recommended for an entrapped economy in
poverty.

On the other hand, a high tax rate reduces the individuals utility of current
consumption. Another problem is to find a tax rate that maximizes individuals’ utility
over both periods of their lives. This tax rate, , is an optimal rate that maximizes
the following problem when the optimal choices of individuals are given:
where V is an intertemporal welfare function and and
are individual’s optimal
choice, from Euler’s equation and budget constraints.
As a result, a social planner faces two separate questions that might arrive at a
dilemma: whether to select a tax rate that maximizes the utility of today’s generation
over its lifespan and remain in a trap forever, or once adopt a higher tax rate which
releases the economy from the trap but at the cost of lower utility for the present
generation. This dilemma appears more problematic in a democracy in which the
future generation has no voting rights and the present generation is reluctant to
sacrifice its early consumption. This poverty trap model once again reiterates that
development requires a ‘big push’, however, in protection rather than production.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
An extensive body of knowledge exists regarding the poverty trap as a selfreinforcing mechanism in which a free market fails to develop. The present work
provides theoretical explanations for the situations wherein not only free markets fail
but also interventions, internal or external, are partially or completely ineffective in
poverty reduction. Two factors contribute to these striking results: first, the concept of
protection of productive capital; and second, individuals’ preferences that shape their
consumption choice in reaction to any rise in the expected rate of return of
investments.
It is worth to notice that as Guvenen (2006) provides evidence, we can consider
heterogeneity in intertemporal elasticity of substitution and assume low elasticity
(high θ) for the poor versus high elasticity (low θ) for the rich. One of the results of
this study is to shed light on the contradicting historical experiences on foreign aid.
The success of Marshal Plan for post-WWII Western Europe and the failure of
foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to escapable or inescapable traps
resulting from differences in elasticity of substitution.
This paper is an initial step towards recognition of the role of protective capital in
development economics. Further theoretical work is required to study the process of
protective capital creation and the role of political agents. How political incentives
might result in underinvestment in protection and what are the interactions between
protective capital accumulation and institutions?
The introduction of thresholds of protective capital in the probability functions
accounts for a number of our results. It is reasonable to relax this assumption using
continuous probability functions.
Further work is also required to examine the empirical relevance of inescapable
and escapable poverty traps. If our view of underdevelopment is valid then there
should be a relationship between long-term stagnation and LDCs’ reactions to
foreign aid. Another quantitative exercise can focus on the calibration of the low and
high steady state equilibria to assess the theory.
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The steady-state level for a pulse probability function of productive capital survival
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The steady-state level for a general probability function of productive capital survival
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